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Abstract 
This contribution describes the decisions and actions taken by the Torino Organizing 
Committee for the XX Olympic Winter Games. The events presented in the case are analyzed in 
the light of different theoretical perspectives in order to reflect on the planning process of a 
unique event, one that could not be postponed or delayed, such as the Olympic Games. 
This work is aimed neither at identifying best practices leading to successful events, nor at 
implementing a checklist for future operators involved in the organization of next Olympic 
Games; instead, through developing different theoretical interpretations, this paper proposes an 
organizational discussion about relevant phenomena and fosters a reflection on wider issues 
related to organizational design and people management in unique events. 
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The organization of a unique event: 
the case of the Olympic Games of Torino 2006 
Francesco Maria Barbini 
Università di Bologna 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The organizational analysis and discussion of cases not directly 
connected to business practice is both interesting and not very usual. However, 
these cases are important since they allow to study decision-making processes 
and to highlight unusual phenomena that can be used to understand and 
explain typical managerial issues; they also allow to develop "out of the box" 
reflections, leaving out traditional assumptions and the study of business 
models. This contribution presents the decisions and actions taken by the 
Torino Organizing Committee for the XX Olympic Winter Games1 (TOROC). 
The events presented in the case are analyzed in the light of different theoretical 
perspectives, to reflect on the planning process of a unique event, one that 
could not be postponed or delayed, such as the Olympic Games. 
This work is aimed neither at identifying best practices leading to 
successful events, nor at implementing a checklist for future operators involved 
in the organization of next Olympic Games; instead, through developing 
different theoretical interpretations, this paper intends to foster the 
understanding of the most relevant phenomena and the reflection on the main 
issues related to the organization of a unique event. 
Another interesting note: when we refer to the "organization of the 
Olympic Games", the term "organization" is used, from a lexical point of view, 
according to a meaning which is quite different from the one typically adopted 
                                                
1 The most important organizational choices adopted by TOROC in the 2000-2004 period are detailed in 
Barbini, Melloni, 2005. 
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by the management literature: in this case, "organization" does not mean 
"orderly system" but rather "the process of regulation to achieve an objective", 
as this allows to reflect on the procedural, dynamic and progressive dimension 
of organization, avoiding the typical reification of the concept. 
 
The Olympic Games 
It all began in 776 BC in Olympia. According to the Greek tradition, the 
first Olympic Games were held that year in honor of Zeus, father of the gods. 
The Olympiad soon became the most important religious event celebrated in 
the Panhellenic world. With the Games, the Greeks celebrated the newfound 
awareness of the national spirit after long centuries of difficulties, following the 
fall of the Mycenaean kingdom of 1100 BC (Swaddling, 1984; Morgan, 1990; 
Young, 2004). Continuously played every four years, for a total of 293 editions, 
the Olympics were suspended at the end of the Third Century AD by Roman 
Emperor Theodosius. Since then, the Olympic Games remained in oblivion for 
nearly fifteen centuries, until 1896, when he first modern Olympic Games were 
held in Athens. 
The initiative to revive the Olympic Games is due to Baron Pierre de 
Coubertin, who deemed them as the best means of bringing the sport "at the 
service of the harmonious development of the man, to encourage the peaceful 
coexistence and the preservation of dignity among men". According to the 
intentions of Pierre de Cubertin, the Olympics should have been aimed at 
establishing and spreading a “life philosophy” extolling the qualities of body, 
spirit and mind. 
Inspired by historical documents and archaeological findings, and 
sometimes “inventing“ rituals and traditions, Cubertin coagulated around him 
a group of people animated by the same ideals and, in 1894, formed the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) in order to organize the first modern 
Olympic Games (Young, 1996; 2005). 
Within a century, the Olympic Games have become the most important 
sporting event in the world, in terms of number of competitions, athletes, and 
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participating nations. The Games are also an unparalleled social and media 
event, unique in terms of size, atmosphere, universality, and values. Athletes, 
spectators, sponsors, and media recognize this uniqueness and demonstrate an 
unmatched interest (DaCosta, 2002; Guala, 2003). 
The Olympic Games are held every four years in a city designated by the 
IOC. The organization of the Games gives honors and responsibilities, and it 
also generates opportunities for the host city. There are very important honors: 
for fifteen days (the duration of the event), the host city becomes the seat of the 
Olympic flame and the ideal core of the dreams and hopes of millions of 
athletes and supporters. On the other hand, the preparation of such a particular 
event imposes heavy duties: it is necessary to implement infrastructures, sports 
facilities, recreational sites and to effectively manage fifteen days filled with 
competitions and events. Finally, the Olympic Games are a great opportunity 
that the city can use to gain visibility and prestige worldwide, and to 
implement a series of investments that can deliver significant and long-lasting 
improvements in infrastructures and public services (Andranovich et al., 2001; 
Cashman, Hughes, 1999). 
The challenge for the organizers of the Olympics is, therefore, to devise 
and implement a large set of interventions in order to promote the worldwide 
image of the city and the nation, to keep costs below acceptable thresholds, and 
above all, to ensure a broad social return on investments. 
The Winter Olympic Games, introduced more recently than the Summer 
Games, replicate, albeit on a smaller scale, the organization and ceremonies of 
the latter. Initially, the Winter Olympics were not part of the Olympic 
movement. In 1924, the organizers of the Paris Olympic Games decided to 
promote, six months after the summer event, the Winter Games in Chamonix. 
The success of these Games prompted the IOC, in 1925, to amend its statute to 
allow the Summer Olympic Games host countries to organize, in the same year, 
the Winter Games. In 1948 the IOC decided to separate the organization of 
Summer and Winter Games, so it became possible to assign them to different 
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countries. Finally, in 1986, the IOC amended its statute to impose a two-year 
distance between Summer and Winter Games (Deschiens, 1979; Mogor, 1989). 
The Summer and Winter Games have significant differences. The latter 
still have a minor impact on the media and a narrower interest of the public 
(Essex, Chalkley, 2004). In addition, the Summer Olympics are held in large 
cities, while Winter Games are assigned to medium-sized cities located in areas 
well suited to snow sports. In numerical terms, the summer games involve a 
number of athletes five times higher than the Winter Games and generate a TV 
audience incomparably higher. However, the same differences is not so evident 
in terms of infrastructure needs and of investments required (Lesja, 2000); 
overall, the complexity and the organizational challenges are rather similar. 
The next paragraphs will explain the organization of the Olympic 
Movement, the characteristics and history of the Olympic Games of  Torino 
2006, the nature and activities of the Organizing Committee and the evolution 
of its organizational configurations. A theoretical discussion will conclude the 
paper. 
 
The International Olympic Committee 
In its initial configuration, as drafted by Pierre de Coubertin in 1894, the 
International Olympic Committee was composed of fifteen people (aristocrats 
and men of culture and sports) from twelve different countries. Currently, the 
IOC gathers more than one hundred representatives from eighty countries. It 
works in close collaboration with the International Sports Federations (ISFs) 
and with National Olympic Committees (NOCs) (Chappelet, Kübler-Mabbott, 
2008). 
The IOC is the organization in charge of planning and promoting the 
Olympic Games in accordance with the Olympic Charter. In addition, it 
pursues the widespread diffusion of the values of peace and nonviolence, and 
the affirmation of equality among men and between the sexes. It has to promote 
ethics in sports, to fight any kind of doping, and to protect the environment. 
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Finally, the IOC should oppose the (ideological and commercial) exploitation of 
sport activities and athletes and support education to sports. 
Today, the IOC is an "international organization, non-governmental and 
non-profit", based in Lausanne, Switzerland, which acts as the coordinator of 
the Olympic Movement activities (IOC, 2007). Members are individuals acting 
as representatives of the IOC in their respective countries, not vice versa, i.e. as 
delegates of their respective countries at the IOC. The IOC chooses and elects its 
members from a slate of subjects deemed as qualified by its Executive Board. It 
is therefore a system of strict cooptation, which has been criticized in recent 
times and it is suitable for being changed in the medium term (Crowther, 2002). 
In addition to the assembly of members and the President, a body with broad 
authority is the Executive Board. This Board includes the IOC President, four 
Vice-Presidents with specific attributions and ten other members. The Executive 
Board is in charge of the strategic, administrative, and financial management of 
the IOC and controls the process for the selection of candidate cities to host the 
Games. 
The International Olympic Committee is the sole owner of the Olympic 
Games, as well as of their symbols and logos, flag, motto, and anthem. The IOC 
gathers most of its revenues from the sale of rights related to merchandising, 
broadcasting and reproduction of the images of the Olympic Games. It is also 
financed by long-term sponsorship agreements with multinational companies 
(Tomlinson, 2005). 
The honor of hosting the Olympic Games is awarded to a city by the 
IOC, through a complex process of evaluation and selection (Booth, 2005; 
Persson, 2000). The selection process begins with a formal request (which must 
be issued and supported by the National Olympic Committee) from the 
municipality of the city interested in hosting the Games. The Government of the 
concerned country must demonstrate its compliance with the Olympic Charter. 
In addition, the candidate city must exhibit satisfactory financial guarantees. 
Applications are examined by specific evaluation committees. The IOC 
autonomously selects the host city seven years before the Games. 
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Immediately after choosing the host city, the IOC signs with the city and 
its Government a written contract (Host City Contract) which specifies in detail 
the duties of the organizers of the Games. Then, the NOC must establish an 
Organizing Committee (OCOG) which, since its establishment, will interact 
directly with the IOC and receive appropriate instructions form it. The 
Organizing Committee must assume the status of legal person and its Executive 
Committee should include at least one IOC member belonging to the host 
country, the President and the Secretary General of the National Olympic 
Committee and at least one representative of the host city. The Executive 
Committee may also include other prominent figures. 
Since its creation and until its dissolution, the OCOG must carry out their 
activities in accordance with the Olympic Charter, the host city contract, and 
with the instructions received from the Executive Committee of the IOC. In case 
of violation of general rules or inefficiencies in the organization process, the 
IOC keeps the right to withdraw, at any time and with immediate effect, the 
organization of the Olympic Games from the host city. The NOC, the OCOG 
and the host city are jointly liable for all obligations established for the 
organization of the Olympic Games, except for financial obligations, which will 
be entirely assumed by the host city and the OCOG. 
An essential tool recently developed by the IOC in order to support the 
activities of Organizing Committees is the Olympic Knowledge Transfer 
Programme (also known as Olympic Games Knowledge Services). This is a 
recent innovation, aimed at providing organizers with documentation and best 
practices related to all stages, from the preparation of application documents to 
the debriefing of the event. The Knowledge Services should enable the 
collection and management of information, know-hows and experience related 
to the organization of the Olympics. In addition, they are expected to make the 
transfer of knowledge from one edition to another smoother and then to reduce 
the costs, complexity and risks related to the organization of the Games. Two 
mottos summarize the objectives of this Olympic knowledge management 
system (Quick, Taylor, 2000): "Stop re-inventing the wheel" and "Adaptation 
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rather than invention". The first motto expresses the principle that the 
organization of the Games involves typical choices and solutions that can be 
bequeathed from one edition to another. Hence OCOGs can avoid the repetition 
of traditional analysis, trials and errors. Evidently, the proposed solutions can 
not be fully replicated, because of the intrinsic difference between every edition 
of the Games. This paves the way to the second motto: the Organizing 
Committee is not constrained to adopt the choices recommended by the 
Knowledge management system, instead, it is asked to adapt them to suit its 
specific needs and context. 
By taking advantage of  the Olympic Knowledge management system,  
organizers may (Tzelepi, Quick, 2002): 
- Access a set of predefined rules and routines covering the whole 
preparation process, this may facilitate the work of those who, without 
specific knowledge (and without experience) have to plan the event; 
- Collaborate with IOC members and with the world's leading experts in 
relation to specific domains; 
- Access simulation environments, in order to test the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the operational solutions adopted; 
- Participate in seminars, workshops, training initiatives (e.g. observer 
programs, debriefing and post-event analysis); 
- Connect to a database containing information and case studies related to the 
various domains of the activities of the Organizing Committee. 
The main benefits of this knowledge management system include: higher 
levels of efficiency in the organization of the event (the reuse of already 
established practices and techniques allows to avoid common mistakes and 
redundant costs), the strengthening of the brand of the event (in particular, the 
uniformity of the organizational solutions adopted by OCOGs makes the 
editions of Games more similar to each other, enabling the development of a 
consolidated image and facilitating the cooperation with business partners), 
and the continuous improvement of the knowledge base available for future 
organizers. 
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The genesis of Torino 2006 
In the early Nineties, the city of Torino was experiencing a period of 
stagnation, in particular because of the decline of the automotive industry 
which, for at least a century, had driven the local economic growth. In this 
period, local authorities committed themselves to enable the evolution of the 
city and its hinterland into a new model of regional development, based on the 
exploitation of cultural heritage and tourism (Bobbio, Guala, 2002). 
The application for the organization of the Turin Winter Olympic Games, 
launched in 1998 by local government (municipality, province and region), is 
part of that strategy of territorial development. On March 18th 1998 the 
municipality and the promoting committee officially launched the bid for the 
Torino Olympic Games. Other candidate cities were Sion (Switzerland), 
Klagenfurt (Austria), Helsinki (Finland), Zakopane (Poland), and  Poprad Tatry 
(Slovakia). On August 31st 1998, the candidacy dossier was submitted to the 
IOC. From October 15th to 17th 1998, the IOC evaluation commission was 
received in Torino to explain the contents of the application. Finally, in Seoul, 
on June 19th  1999, the General Assembly of the IOC assigned the 2006 Winter 
Olympic Games to the city of Torino. On the same date, the mayor of Torino 
and the President of the Italian Olympic Committee (CONI) signed the Host 
City Contract, i.e. the contract by which the host city and host National 
Olympic Committee assume the responsibility to respect the rules defined by 
the IOC for the organization of the Games. 
In Torino, the Olympic Games have been scheduled for the period from 
February 10th to 26th 2006, with athletes from 80 countries belonging to 15 
different sports to compete for 84 titles (and 252 medals). Overall, the 
Organizing Committee estimated the participation of 2,500 athletes, 2,500 
coaches and national delegations, 2,300 representatives from the IOC, National 
Olympic Committees and Sports Federations, 650 judges and referees, in 
addition to 10,000 journalists and 6,000 people invited by the sponsors. 
In order to allow the efficient conduct of competitions, the Organizing 
Committee deliberated to set up five indoor venues, nine outdoor venues, and 
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one training venue. Twelve non-competitive venues have also been provided 
(Olympic Stadium, villages for athletes, Medal Plaza, MPC - Main Press Center, 
IBC - International Broadcast Centre, OFH - Olympic Family Hotels), together 
with eight villages to house journalists and eighty service sites (Headquarters of 
the Organizing Committee, MOC - Main Operation Centre, Main Accreditation 
Centre, offices, warehouses, parking lots, etc..). 
 
TOROC, The Organizing Committee of Olympic Games 
On December 27th 1999, the TOROC (Torino Organizing Committee for 
the 2006 Olympic Winter Games) was established. 
TOROC is configured as a non-profit foundation under private law in 
charge for carrying out the obligations assumed by the City of Torino and the 
Italian Olympic Committee when they signed the Host City Contract. 
The Committee has been recognized and regulated by the Italian Law 
26/03/2003 n.48; the art.2 of this law reads: "The Organizing Committee of 
Olympic Games is a private foundation incorporated on December 27th 1999 by 
the City of Torino and the Olympic Committee in fulfillment of the contractual 
agreements between them and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
with the agreement signed in Seoul on June 19th  1999”. The organizing 
committee acts under private law, but when negotiating contracts with third 
parties it is required to apply principles of transparency and non-
discrimination. 
The most important responsibilities undertaken by TOROC are: 
- The planning, organization and management of sporting events and 
ceremonies, the Olympic Village for athletes and coaches, the villages for 
journalists, the Press Center, International Broadcasting Center and any 
event included in the Olympic program; 
- The design and implementation of temporary structures, the planning and 
arrangement of accommodations and transports for the various client 
groups; 
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- The management of medical and security services, in coordination with 
public authorities; 
- The development and implementation of the marketing plan. 
 
TOROC acts in close coordination with Agenzia Torino 2006, a public body 
established by Law 9/10/2000 n.285:  "The Agenzia Torino 2006 has legal 
personality under public law and it develops its own organizational, 
administrative and accounting procedures. The Agency is governed by private 
law. The Agency carries out the action plan defined by the Organizing 
Committee of Olympic Games, to enable the coordinated and timely success of 
the Olympics. [...] It acts tacking also into account the needs for post-event 
reutilization of permanent facilities and infrastructures"(Law 285/2000, Art. 2 
and 3). 
Ultimately, the Agenzia Torino 2006 has assumed the responsibility for 
all the investments in infrastructures and permanent installations which are 
intended to serve the community well beyond the Olympic Games. TOROC is 
in charge of all activities connected with the organization of the Games and all 
the investments in temporary structures, which are intended to be used only for 
the duration of the event. 
TOROC developed an action plan (detailing locations, priorities, costs, 
technical and functional requirements) approved by the Italian government, 
while the Agenzia Torino 2006 had the task of managing the procurement 
processes. 
Overall, more than 65 sporting facilities, infrastructure, roads, villages 
for athletes and journalists were planned. The total expenditure was estimated 
at 1,700 million Euro, partially covered by private and public investors. 
TOROC activities have been funded by partner companies (divided into 
four categories: top sponsors, major sponsors, official suppliers and sponsors), 
television rights, revenues from the sale of tickets, licensing rights on logos and 
sales of services and products during and after the Games. 
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About 40% of TOROC’s revenues came from television rights, 40% from 
sponsorship contracts, 10% from ticket sales and the remaining 10% from 
merchandising. The costs were mainly related to staff and management, 
information systems, and to the implementation of temporary structures. 
 
The "crafts" of the TOROC 
The complexity of the organization of the Olympic Games is well 
expressed by its own peculiarities. First of all, the Olympic Games are a one-
shot event (single, without any possibility of repetition), with non-extendable 
deadlines. This requires a rigorous pre-ordination of the available means in 
order to achieve the predefined goal. The uniqueness of the event does not 
allow hypothesizing paths of improvement over the time. 
Secondly, the organization of the Games is created from scratch: the 
Organizing Committee has to design and to build the sites, to select and recruit 
the staff and to develop skills and competencies. The Games require relevant 
investments both in facilities where sporting events will take place (the so-
called competitive venues) and in non-competitive sites (i.e. non-competitive 
venues, Olympic Villages, shops, medal plaza, etc.). In addition, the organizers 
of every edition of the Games do not have, with few exceptions, skills and 
experience directly related to such domain. People involved in the organization 
of the Games usually have important managerial background, however they 
need to learn the so-called "Olympic knowledge", i.e. specific knowledge about 
the planning and management of Olympic events. 
Thirdly, the organization of the Games evolves gradually (ramp-up by 
phases) and dissolves very quickly (sudden ramp-down). After a very slow 
phase of growth, the dissolution of the organization takes place very quickly, 
immediately after the conclusion of the Games. The full availability of resources 
and staff takes places just a few months before the event. On the other side, all 
commitments must be fulfilled almost instantaneously at the end of the event. 
This obviously creates problems of coordination as well as the need for the 
simultaneous management of many events concentrated in a limited timeframe. 
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The greater part of the activities of the Organizing Committee is related to the 
planning and preparation of the Games: the operational phase itself (the 
management of the Games) lasts no more than twenty days, compared to about 
seven years of preparation. The days of actual operation, however, are occupied 
by many simultaneous events (competitions, awards, ceremonies, etc.) carried 
out in many different locations. 
Finally, the organization of the Olympic Games is particularly vulnerable 
to the impact of external events, just to cite the most relevant:  risk of terrorist 
attacks, possible effects of war or political events, the variability of weather 
conditions. These sources of uncertainty are clearly unavoidable and require 
organizational solutions in order to prevent them and to limit their 
consequences, in full respect of the calendar of events. 
For the preparation and the organization of the Olympic Games, the 
Organizing Committee must bear numerous contractual obligations (as detailed 
by the Host City Contract) which require the provision of specific services to 
the different classes of "clients": spectators, athletes and delegations of the 
National Olympic Committees, Sport Federations, sponsors and journalists. 
These different ”clients” have to be placed in positions where they are able to 
play their role and to take part in the spectacle. 
In particular, for the Torino Winter Olympic Games, the Organizing 
Committee carried specific responsibilities in terms of: 
- Installations: TOROC manages all venues, is responsible for their 
preparation, for the preparation of temporary structures (stands, hospitality 
areas, parking lots, services, radio and TV infrastructures), for the 
organization of health services and for catering and waste disposal. Overall, 
TOROC manages thirteen competitive sites (Palasport Olimpico and Torino 
Esposizioni, Palavela, Oval Lingotto, Pinerolo, Pragelato, Pragelato Plan, 
Bardonecchia, Sauze d'Oulx, Cesana Pariol, Cesana San Sicario, San Sicario 
Fraiteve, Sestriere), three non-competitive sites (Medal Plaza, Stadium and 
Ceremonies of the Torino-Caselle International Airport), three Olympic 
villages and seven villages for journalists; 
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- Communications and media: TOROC, through its division TOBO (Torino 
Olympic Broadcasting Organization), is in charge of the production and 
diffusion of the TV signal to all broadcasters (about eighty) who have 
acquired the rights to broadcast the Olympic Games. This commitment is 
related to the preparation and management of the International 
Broadcasting Centre (IBC, International Broadcasting Center), the Main 
Press Centre (MPC Main Press Center), fourteen Venue Media Centres 
(VMC Press decentralized centers); 
- Sport: TOROC, in addition to managing competition and training facilities, 
must manage the three Olympic villages to allow all the national teams to 
compete in the best ways. To ensure equal opportunities to all countries 
participating in the Olympic Games,  Organizing Committees are used to 
cover the travel expenses of the sport teams; 
- Information technology: IT-related spending accounts for about a quarter of 
the budget of the TOROC. Investments are headed to five main areas: 
telecommunications, internet, timing and results, information technology, 
planning. In terms of equipment, during the Time Games, TOROC provides 
500 network servers linking 4,500 desktops and 600 laptops (the network 
system must be able to manage up to 11,000 e-mails messages per working 
day), 12,000 wired telephones, 5,000 TV sets and 6,000 digital radios for 
internal communications; 
- Transport: TOROC, in collaboration with local transport companies, should 
provide transport services to more than 20,000 people. 
In addition to these activities, TOROC is in charge of the organization of 
the ceremonies, the management of accreditations, the provision of 
accommodation services, the organization of the Olympic Torch Relay and the 
management of the artistic and cultural programs. 
Overall, the Organizing Committee should play more than forty “crafts”, 
from logistics planning to public relations, (for a synthetic list of TOROC’s jobs, 
see Figure 1). 
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Institutional*activities*
Communication*
External*relations*and*lobbying*
Media*relations*
Planning*activities*
Development*and*implementation*of*projects*for*permanent*structures*
Development*and*implementation*of*projects*for*temprary*structures*
Planning*of*operational*activities*and*client*services*
Sponsorship*
Ticketing*
Licensing/Merchandising*
Allocation*
Accreditation*
Planning*of*the*transportation*system*
Planning*of*security*system*
Operations*
Operational*management*of*the*sites*
Event*management*
Media*services*
Broadcasting*
Medical*services*
Security*/*Surveillance*
Spectator*services*
Facility*management*
Transports*and*logistics*
Client*services*
Services*to*the*IOC*
Support*activities*
Program*management*
Accounting,*finance,*auditing,*risk*management,*legal*services,*contracts*
Recruitment,*selection,*management*and*training*of*human*resources*
Organizational*development,*Organization,*Procedures*
IT*applications,*infrastructures,*IT*services*
Procurement*of*goods*and*services*
Figure 1. The "crafts" of TOROC, our adaptation from Barbini, Melloni, 2005. 
 
Obviously, the Organizing Committee can not directly carry out all these 
activities. Hence, TOROC has defined a strategy to select the (core) activities to 
be managed directly and those suitable for being outsourced to external 
partners. In general, TOROC has decided to directly manage all activities 
deemed to be “Olympic” (for example, the design and development of venues 
and of temporary installations, the planning and management of events and 
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competitions, the anti-doping activities), the process of analysis and definition 
of clients’ requirements, and the management of TV productions. Furthermore, 
TOROC has decided to claim for itself the management of other critical 
activities, such as, for instance, the management of the relations with National 
Olympic Committees and Sport Federations, the management of accreditations 
and the management of front-end services  to clients. All other activities have 
been outsourced to external service providers.  
The outsourcing of these activities required a choice about the method 
for managing supply-chain relationships. TOROC took into consideration three 
options: 
- Shattered outsourcing, i.e. the development of a large network of contracts 
with many suppliers; 
- Outsourcing to service providers, i.e. the outsourcer is in charge of the 
strategic management an control of activities, while the service provider has 
to arrange the operations, by coordinating a large number of suppliers; 
- Outsourcing to general contractors/integrators: identification of few 
partners who take the overall responsibility for the management of entire 
processes (then, every partner can outsource its activities to other subjects). 
TOROC decided to avoid pursuing extreme cost efficiency by means of 
shattered outsourcing since such solution would have created relevant 
problems in terms of coordination and control. Instead, it outsourced the 
activities related to the implementation and management of venues to service 
providers. Finally, it outsourced to   general contractors all the activities related 
to the logistics, the organization of car rental services and the implementation 
of villages for journalists. 
 
The formal configuration of TOROC 
TOROC began its operations in late 2001, adopting a traditional 
functional configuration: functions became the basis for aggregating the various 
categories of operators and for enabling the development of specific knowledge 
and expertise. 
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The rationale of this choice was twofold. On the one hand, the Executive 
Committee of TOROC deemed this configuration very effective in enabling the 
emergence and evolution of  specialist Olympic knowledge, namely a set of 
knowledge and critical skills which are hard (if not impossible) to find on the 
market. On the other hand, this choice was strongly influenced by the fact that 
the IOC had been adopting the same configuration: it was not an imposition, 
rather it has been a solution driven by the need to intensively interact with 
specific functions of IOC and by the opportunity to take full advantage of the 
documentation, in particular best practices and know-hows prepared according 
to functional criteria. 
TOROC has therefore set up an organization headed by a General 
Director who directly coordinates some Functional Units shaped around the 
main "crafts" assigned to the Committee (Figure 2). Internal auditing and 
control activities were carried out in a functional perspective, mainly based on 
the budget of the Function. 
In the intentions of TOROC, finally, the functional configuration 
appeared very suitable for supporting the progressive growth of the staff, from 
200 units at the end of 2001, to about 800 of the end of 2004, to more than 1500 
units at the end of 2005. 
In 2003, TOROC implemented a self-assessment of its organizational 
performance to evaluate its efficiency and to identify evolutionary paths. The 
results of the assessment were not encouraging: first of all, the Functions 
rapidly succeeded in developing skills and specialist know-hows and were able 
to interface effectively with the IOC, but then they started to focus on their 
particular problems, neglecting more general issues. In particular, this emphasis 
on the objectives of the Function was generating significant problems of 
coordination and conflict resolution. 
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Figure 2. The formal configuration of TOROC in 2004. Adapted from Barbini, Melloni, 
2005.  
 
The assessment showed the need for a catalyzation of commitments and 
special efforts toward common goals. The fragmentation of planning and 
control processes, carried out almost exclusively in terms of Functions, 
hindered the development of shared goals and prevented the full recognition of 
the global processes. The recognition of these problems forced TOROC to act, at 
the end of 2003, by developing a strategic roadmap and revising its formal 
configuration to allow higher levels of collaboration between different 
functions. The interventions on the organizational chart were, in essence, those 
typically implemented to make a functional configuration more focused on 
results and customers, in particular: 
- Identification and formalization of critical cross-functional processes; 
- Creation of transversal groups (clusters), called "coordination", consistent 
with operational areas, to coordinate subjects performing homologous 
activities in different functions; 
- Establishment of committees to ensure points of contact and exchange of 
information for the top management of the Functions to allow the definition 
and development of shared strategic directions; 
- Development of cross-functional projects aimed at specific interfunctional 
targets. 
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In addition to these interventions, the management of TOROC imposed 
the formalization of the channels of authority and responsibility and adopted 
techniques of internal marketing (by means of formal and informal 
communications) in order to generate consensus and unity of action within the 
Organizing Committee. 
 
The roadmap 
The assessment conducted in 2003 showed, in addition to coordination 
problems, the lack of any common vision able to direct the efforts of the 
subjects towards common and consistent goals. This may seem counterintuitive 
for an organization created with a very clear instrumental orientation (i.e. 
organizing and managing the Olympic Games); however, it is understandable if 
we consider the differences in terms of crafts, experience, training and 
specialization of the actors involved. 
 
Figure 3. The roadmap. 
 
Therefore, TOROC has implemented a roadmap, i.e. a master plan to 
coalesce internal efforts and consensus. The roadmap is not a single document, 
but a sum of plans with different levels of detail connected with each other 
(Figure 3). 
Hitherto, each Function operated in accordance with guidelines 
developed by its own management team. In 2003,  new guidelines (concepts) 
were developed for each Function to define qualitative indications (in terms of 
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mission of the Function, categories of clients, contractual obligations, activities, 
service levels, formal configuration, operative requirements, risks involved) 
about the way it was intended to operate during the Games time. In 2004, these 
concepts have been translated into Functional Operation Manuals, i.e. an 
aggregation of detailed and quantitative descriptions of the operations planned 
for the period of the Games. These manuals were expected to become the 
source of specific rules and procedures to guide the action of each operator 
during the Games. Then, individual training initiatives have been based on the 
activities specified by the manual. 
In parallel to these interventions focused on the Functions, TOROC has 
initiated a process of definition and planning of the activities within each 
venue. Such planning process started with the definition of the venue concept, 
that is, a translation of Functional Concepts at the level of each venue. In 2004, 
pilot plans were drawn for two Operating Venues, thus allowing the 
development of a Generic Venue Operation Plan, i.e. a set of references 
common to all competitive venues (i.e. those designed to accommodate 
sporting events). 
Finally, thirty-five Venue Operation Plans (one for each venue, 
competitive and non-competitive) were elaborated to define the operational 
activities of each venue. These plans identified the management processes of 
each venue, such as the cross-functional breakdown of the Functional 
Operational Manuals, and the interfaces between the various operational 
functions within the venue. 
TOROC developed the roadmap as a shared platform for enabling the 
organizational evolution and as a forum for internal discussion.  
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Figure 2. The formal configuration of TOROC in 2006. Adapted from TOROC, 2006. 
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The Venuization Process 
This hybrid functional configuration has been designed to operate for a 
short period of time: in fact, in mid-2005, TOROC started the process of 
venuization, which implemented a massive decentralization of people, 
authorities and responsibilities to the venues. Therefore, TOROC ceased to be 
monolithic and centralized and it was replaced by a TOROC with many 
headquarters, where authority and responsibility were separated and allocated 
to the venues. 
Hence, the formal configuration underwent a very important change, 
from functional and centralized to output-based and decentralized. 
Consequently, venues became the main basis of aggregation of people 
and resources.  
The participants in the organization (now more than 1,500) were 
progressively assigned to their specific venue and, in addition to changing 
workplace, they changed their role, responsibilities and reporting lines (the 
functional reporting lines were partly replaced by venue-based reporting lines). 
At the corporate level, the Main Operations Centre (MOC) and the heads of 
Functional departments remained. 
The MOC and the Functional Departments worked as the main interfaces 
toward the external environments, were in charge of the coordination between 
the venues and the global management of knowledge and competencies. On the 
other hand, venues received a complete operational responsibility, they were 
asked to set up their own processes for the efficient management of their events 
(competitive and non-competitive).  
The relationship between the center and the venues implied that 
operational decisions were delegated almost entirely to the venue, with the 
Center only invoked in case of decisions involving more venues or concerning 
general problems. The activities of the venue were configured according to a 
sort of matrix where each operator was submitted to a dual reporting system: 
toward the venue managers for the operational activities and toward central 
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functional managers with respect to the activities related to procedures and 
know-hows. 
It should be noted that the venuization process is not a peculiar strategy 
defined by TOROC, on the contrary, it has been suggested by the IOC that, also 
by means of success stories and best practices, in fact imposed it. The venues 
became a sort of quasi-enterprises acting according to their needs, within a 
framework managed by MOC and Functional departments. They were led by a 
"venue team", which was designed to bring together all the skills necessary for 
the operation of each venue and was responsible for the activities performed 
during the test events and the Games time. It was a permanent team composed 
by people allocated by the Functions according to the specific activities to be 
carried out. The venue team actually consisted of three entities, which can be 
represented as three concentric circles gradually expanding over time, as the 
Games Time approached: 
- Lead team, i.e. the managers of the venue, the designer of the temporary 
works (overlay) and the sport managers; 
- Core team, which gathered the heads of key functions to be carried out by the 
venue (transport, logistics and services to viewers, technology, human 
resource management, security, etc.); the core team also included a contact 
person from TOBO in charge of the coordination between its central unit and 
the venue management; 
- External team, which included all the people responsible for the operations of 
the venue (medical services, tickets, protocol, ceremonies and events, public 
relations, communications, catering services...). 
Each venue manager had a specific budget to cover the special needs 
arising during the Games time. Figure 5 describes the formal configuration of a 
competitive venue during the Games. 
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Figure 5. The formal configuration of a competitive venue. Adapted from TOROC, 
2006. 
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The Games time 
The venue-based configuration has been designed to operate in 
decentralized ways during the Games time. Therefore, every venue had 
attributions and authorities to handle its workload (including competitions and 
all side events). At the central level, MOC had to collect relevant data about the 
conduct of every event, to monitor the key indicators of organizational 
performance, and to manage all the critical issues which could not be faced by 
the single venue. 
The MOC was also involved in meetings with the highest representatives 
of the IOC who were in charge of overseeing the correct management of the 
event. Alongside the work of the MOC, a Command Center had to deal with 
functional issues related to specialist areas (e.g. transportation problems) and 
worked in coordination with the functional task force of the IOC. 
Therefore, the most part of Games has been managed directly by the 
venues. The coordination and resolution of general problems was left to central 
authorities (MOC and Functional Directions) operating in conjunction with the 
Public Authorities (Prefecture, etc..) and with the IOC (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. The global configuration during the Games. Adapted from Barbini, Melloni, 
2005 and TOROC, 2006. 
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The management of human resources 
Usually, people do not participate in the organization of the Olympic 
Games more than once in a lifetime. While there are few Olympic professionals, 
the majority of the staff composing the OCOGs is people without any kind of 
expertise on the Olympic domain. The IOC offers to OCOG members many 
training programs aimed at generating and disseminating Olympic knowledge. 
In addition, Organizing Committees usually pay great attention to internal 
training (Van der Wagen, 2007). 
The HRM process starts with the selection of the staff. 
TOROC has adopted ad-hoc strategies for selecting its staff; in particular, 
TOROC decided to look for people with expertise on the functional activities to 
be carried out, without caring about Olympic knowledge. Hence, TOROC tried 
to attract people with relevant and certified specialist knowledge and, at the 
same time, it developed specific training initiatives for the development of the 
Olympic knowledge. 
Two training streams were identified: specialist training and Olympic 
training. Specialist training took place immediately after the recruitment and 
was very focused on the assigned job. The process of Olympic training, which 
was oriented to the development of in-depth expertise concerning the 
organization of the Olympic Games, has been more complex; it required many 
efforts and ad hoc training. In particular, TOROC has outlined three training 
strategies. The first strategy concerned the development of basic skills, i.e. the 
understanding of basic problems and possible solutions associated with the 
organization of the events. This training allowed people to access the on-line 
knowledge base made available by IOC (including the theoretical frameworks 
and case studies). In addition, TOROC offered training on the job programs 
performed by Olympic experts, and monographic training activities carried out 
by consultants of the IOC. Finally, TOROC managers had the opportunity to 
participate in meetings and discussions with the organizers of the previous 
Games, in particular with the members of the 2002 Salt Lake City’s OCOG. 
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The second strategy has been aimed to the development of the Olympic 
know-how, which concerns specific activities to be undertaken during the 
Olympics. This training has been delivered through two programs provided by 
IOC: the Observer Program, which allowed 150 people from TOROC to 
“witness” the Salt Lake City Games, participating in meetings of the Local 
Organizing Committee, and the Secondement Program, which has allowed 
some "second level" managers (i.e. managers in charge of the coordination of 
operational activities) to participate in the Athens Games with supporting roles 
to the local Organizing Committee. 
The third strategy relied on learning by doing. As noted above, the fact 
that TOROC was established to organize a single event (one-shot) prevented 
any possibility of improvement in operational performances over time. This 
problem has been overcome by means of simulations which allowed both the 
assessment of the overall operational capabilities and the development of 
expertise. TOROC pursued this strategy along three lines of action. First of all, 
the first and simplest form of simulation was implemented to identify possible 
problems which required appropriate reaction activities. This simulation has 
been performed in a “protected environment”, without time pressure, and was 
aimed at stimulating the learning of operational procedures. A second line of 
intervention was based on simulations in which subjects were put in front of 
realistic situations, with a multiplicity of problems to solve and strong time 
pressure. The goal of these simulations was to assess the effectiveness of 
procedures and people’s effectiveness in reacting to situations of high stress. 
Finally, TOROC promoted some rehearsals in which the whole Organizing 
Committee simulated real-time operational situations. 
Besides the training sessions described above, the IOC recommends the 
organization of some Test Events to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the 
OCOG. Since mid-2004, TOROC had been organizing a series of international 
sporting events, with the aim of testing the functionality of venues and their 
operational procedures, the playing fields and every other aspect connected 
with the sports competition, the technical systems (timing, scoring systems, 
 27 
ranking systems etc.), and the organization of human resources (staff, 
volunteers, contractors). In case of Test Event of great complexity (in terms of 
time concentration of events, number of services to be provided and activities to 
be performed), the operating environment was in fact very similar to that of the 
Games time, thus allowing also to assess the support institutions (MOC, 
Accreditation Center, Transport, Logistics, etc..). 
The development of skills is essential to make the organization of the 
Games possible, but it is not sufficient. The motivation of people is also 
fundamental. It is not easy to achieve an adequate involvement by a person 
who is aware that her employment will expire immediately after the Games; in 
addition, no career opportunities or salary upgrades are possible. The "Olympic 
spirit" can boost enthusiasm and involvement, but OCOGs can not rely solely 
on it. TOROC worked to enhance the image and importance of the Games. It 
also adopted compensation systems which delayed the payment of the largest 
part of wages toward the Games time. Finally, TOROC negotiated agreements 
with several private companies for facilitating the reallocation of workers after 
the Games.  
In general, TOROC tended to emphasize that the participation in the 
organization of the Olympic Games could be considered a way for increasing 
the reputation of high-level managers, while it could be as a sort of “gym” for 
lower levels. 
The management of volunteers presented completely different 
challenges. Olympic Games would not be possible without the cooperation of 
thousands of people who, inspired by the "Olympic spirit", voluntarily and 
freely lend their work to the Organizing Committee. They are an essential 
workforce that, in the forefront or behind the scenes, carry out simple but 
fundamental tasks: from the transport of spectators, to the preparation of race 
tracks, to assistance to guests, press, sponsors and athletes. TOROC assigned 
more than 350 tasks to volunteers; these tasks are tightly regulated by detailed 
procedures. The training of volunteers, therefore, was primarily focused on 
such procedures (Kemp, 2002). 
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TOROC planned the need, in Games Time, for about 20,000 volunteers. 
These had to be drawn, selected, motivated, trained and then coordinated. To 
contact and attract volunteers, TOROC launched a dedicated website 
(www.noi2006.it) which, mainly by leveraging the Olympic spirit, ideals and 
values, could stimulate the people’s availability and desire for active 
membership. Furthermore, TOROC has activated agreements with volunteer 
organizations able to convey a large number of "professional volunteers". 
Volunteers were selected by means of direct interviews and submitted to 
a specific training process. At the beginning of 2005, TOROC began to organize 
short meetings to check the availability and motivation of the volunteers who 
joined through the website. During the Games, the Organizing Committee 
provided volunteers with accident and liability insurances, free transportations 
from parking areas to the venues, and meals. They also received the official 
uniform and the "Noi2006" Olympic certificate attesting their involvement in 
the Games. 
 
Discussion 
The events concerning the organization of the Olympic Games can be 
explained from different theoretical perspectives. We are not looking for the 
best interpretation, or the interpretation best suited to explain this case. Instead, 
we will only propose a comparison of different theories for the analysis of 
organizational choices in case of unique events. 
Initially, we will focus on the theories typically adopted to explain the 
organization of the Olympic Games (Project Management, Contingency Theory, 
Neo-institutionalism), then we will propose interpretations based on the 
perspective of Organizational Action (Maggi, Thompson, Simon, Emerson). 
The Theory of Project Management allows an initial and necessary series 
of reflections on the organization of the Games: "[...] within the Olympic 
Movement, the OCOG is the project-based organizational unit that is formed 
with the specific task of coordinating activities related to the organization of the 
Olympic Games "(Ferrara, 2001: 409, our translation). In particular, Ferrara 
 29 
(2001) explains the organization of the Olympic Games as a temporary 
organization (Lundin, 1995) consisting of a network of independent actors, and 
managed according to the rules of project management. 
According to this theoretical perspective (Bartezzaghi et al., 1999), the 
organization of the Games is a project characterized by fixed duration and 
deadlines, clear objectives, and predefined resources. The whole project is 
governed by peculiar governance systems aimed at managing the preparation 
of the event and anticipating contingencies and constraints. 
The duration of the project is evident: the organization is established 
with the foundation of the Organizing Committee and is expiring in the 
immediate aftermath of the Games’  end. The whole life of the project is marked 
by precise temporal constraints and deadlines. 
The objective of TOROC is clear: to ensure that the Games take place as 
smoothly as possible, ensuring that the clients’ requirements defined by the 
Host City Contract are met. These requirements are set out in detail and their 
satisfaction can be measured by precise quantitative analysis (e.g. by linking the 
average waiting time in queue of spectators with the target values provided). If 
all the parameters associated with service levels defined for each client group is 
respected, the Games will be considered well organized. 
Obviously, this monitoring and evaluation strategy requires a significant 
preliminary planning process aimed at identifying client groups, their 
expectations and the levels of service to be provided. TOROC has in fact 
proactively identified the major stakeholders of the Games, profiling them into 
four categories: clients, partners, territory, generic stakeholders. 
"Clients" are athletes and representatives of the Olympic Family, media, 
broadcast operators, sponsors and spectators. Among the "Partners" there are 
the sponsors, including suppliers of goods or services, service providers, the 
Agenzia Torino 2006, operators of public services, local government, the 
prefecture, etc. The "Territory" is composed of volunteers, general public, future 
(post-Games) users of the Olympic structures, economic actors. Finally, the 
category of “Stakeholders” includes the Government, the Municipality of 
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Torino, the Province and the Region, the Board of Directors of TOROC, CONI 
and IOC. 
The focus of TOROC is oriented toward the most important subjects 
belonging to each profile; peculiar value-added services have been developed 
and supplied to each of them.  Other stakeholders are taken into account only 
residually by TOROC, mainly in order to avoid situations of tension and, where 
possible, to provide them with tangible benefits. 
In the framework of these strategic guidelines, TOROC develops its 
planning and control system, which is aimed at translating strategic objectives 
into intermediate milestones to monitor and evaluate the actual behavior of 
workers. The ability to anticipate contingencies and constraints then becomes 
essential to the success of the Olympic Organizing Committee. 
The theory of Project Management proposes different techniques for 
establishing an effective planning and control system.  
First of all, it proposes to adopt a feedforward control system, i.e. to 
proactively seek for  possible future problems before they can attack the 
essential variables of the system (Heylighen, Joslyn, 2001). This control strategy 
requires high capabilities in collecting information on environmental states, in 
developing forecasts about the possible evolution of the objectives of the 
project, and to act to defend the organizational system. The anticipation of the 
constraints should be based on the use, re-use and diffusion of knowledge 
among the subjects, on the extensive use of teamwork, and on the continuous 
experimentation, even through simulations. TOROC has implemented such 
control systems by widely adopting the Olympic knowledge management 
system provided by the IOC. In this way, TOROC profited from the experiences 
of its predecessors, to anticipate and avoid common, traditional problems. 
Beside feedforward, the theory of project management suggests the 
definition of a complete hierarchy of milestones as a fundamental method of 
control. Milestones, with different relevance and priority, allow the continuous 
assessment of the performances and, in case of deviation from the expected 
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path, the possibility for an efficient reaction. Ultimately, they serve to correct 
errors and inaccuracies.  
TOROC continuously monitored its performance with reference to 
formal indicators provided by the IOC (also comparing the results with those of 
previous editions of the Games) and, above all, by testing its operations with 
simulation and test events. 
Finally, Project Management Theory suggests the adoption of policies of 
delegation of authority and control-by-alarm. The decentralization of authority 
to local units would allow decision-making process to be performed closer to 
place where problems arise; moreover, the "center" should be no longer 
overloaded by local problems and would focus on broader issues for which it is 
invoked by the periphery (through so-called "alarms"). TOROC has adopted a 
broad process of delegation (the venuization) thus making the venues largely 
autonomous, leaving the center (MOC) in charge of the overall control. 
The tool commonly deemed essential to effectively govern a project is the 
"project plan", a document containing clear and detailed descriptions of the 
management policies. It can be divided into the following sections: 
- The work breakdown structure, i.e. the breakup of the project into tasks and 
subtasks. This scheme is essential for planning, especially in order to plan 
schedules and resources requirements. In Torino, the roadmap played that 
role, identifying and planning the tasks and resources allocated to both venues 
and Functions. 
- The organization, i.e. the formal division of responsibilities on the activities to 
be carried out. TOROC showed great attention to its formal configuration and 
updated it continuously. 
- The control systems, i.e. the tools and techniques that should guide the 
activities of assessment, control and management. TOROC adopted the service 
levels defined by the Host City Contract together with indicators provided by 
the IOC through its Olympic knowledge base. 
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A problem peculiar to the organization of the Games is related to the 
asymmetry of power in favor of the IOC over the OCOG. Some authors found 
similarities between this situation and the neo-Taylorist separation between 
conception and direction of the organization of the Games (under the 
responsibility of the IOC) and the execution of the activities (carried out mainly 
by volunteers, under the control of the OCOG): "Aspects of Taylorism can be 
observed in the ways in which the Olympic Games have been managed. The 
use of monopoly over Olympic knowledge in particular, give evidence to the 
fact that the event organization process is provided top down to OCOGs from 
the IOC and the conception of games management is done by managers whilst 
delivery takes place predominantly by volunteers"(Theodoraki, 2007). The 
condition of monopoly, which seems to characterize the IOC, has also provided 
inspiration to several attempts to explain the OCOG-CIO relationship in the 
light of the franchising theory (Theodoraki, 2007). 
 
The problems of organizational design experienced by TOROC can be 
also interpreted by means of the Contingency Theory: the classic contribution 
from P.R. Lawrence and J.W. Lorsch (1967) could be very useful to this purpose. 
According to this perspective, the organizational structure is not immutable, yet 
it is a complex set of variables which allow a wide range of choices based on the 
characteristics of the organizational environment. The organization is not 
intended as a monolithic system, it is multifaceted and multiform, and 
composed of several units acting together but exposed to different 
environmental sectors. Each sub-unit is in contact with a particular 
environment and is structured in accordance with such an environment. 
According to Lawrence and Lorsch, the level of "differentiation" between 
the units composing the organization (i.e. “the difference in cognitive and 
emotional orientation among managers in different functional departments”) 
should reflect the environmental diversity. High differentiation can cause high 
centrifugal forces, potentially threatening the performance and, ultimately, the 
life of the organization. The designer of the organization must pursue also the 
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integration (i.e. a “state of collaboration that exists among departments that are 
required to achieve unity of effort by the demands of the environment”) of the 
behavior among the different units . 
Lawrence and Lorsch state that the efficient (and then successful) 
enterprise is the one that is able to differentiate its units according to the needs 
of the environment and, at the same time, to find the appropriate integration 
methods. 
The organizational evolution of TOROC can be interpreted from this 
point of view: it  explains the continuous changes in the organizational 
configuration as an adaptation to changing environmental conditions and the 
tension in the relationship between differentiation and integration of 
organizational units. TOROC is initially configured by functions; the 
differentiation between the units is then very high. The environment is very 
heterogeneous and dynamic, TOROC has tight relationships with a large 
number of different subjects, and therefore the differentiation of its units is 
consistent with such situation. 
The integration is initially left in the shade, under the assumption that 
the hierarchical reporting lines can ensure unity of action and conflict 
resolution. The adoption of a hybrid functional configuration was aimed at 
introducing new techniques of integration between the units, to achieve greater 
cohesion and synergy. 
Finally, the venuization can be interpreted as an answer to the rising 
complexity of the environment during the Games time. This environmental 
complexity should be matched by internal differentiation; the growing 
differentiation would make integration almost impossible to achieve. Hence, 
TOROC decides to make venues almost independent, thus allowing them to 
operate like quasi-enterprises; a central point of integration and coordination 
(the MOC) is then established. 
 
The architectural choices implemented by TOROC can also be 
interpreted according to a perspective which focuses on the organizational 
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design process. To this end, we can adopt the theory of H. Mintzberg (1979):  in 
fact, Mintzberg states that the organizational design is a deliberate and rational 
process which, starting from the objectives of the organization, produces an 
effective formal configuration. The organization of the Olympic Games is then 
explained as the consequence of a rational system of decisions aimed at 
planning in advance tasks, activities and responsibilities. The organizational 
design process is marked by precise steps. It starts with the identification of the 
organizational objectives (i.e. the recognition of the organization’s function with 
reference to the environmental system in which it is placed); then, the designer 
determines all the atomic activities to be carried out to efficiently achieve the 
objectives. After that, she aggregates the activities into jobs, depending on the 
degree of specialization required. Next, the designer determines the needs for 
formalization of each job, and the consequent requirements in terms of training 
and indoctrination. Finally, she designs the "macrostructure", determining 
which and how many jobs should be combined into first-level units, then 
grouping these units into second-level units until she achieves a complete 
hierarchy, which is expressed by the organization chart. 
This theory postulates the fundamental role of the designer, who must be 
able to identify organizational goals and technologies and to rationally 
predetermine activities, processes and jobs. By reason of the complexity of the 
design process, the designer might be tempted to solicit external professionals 
(usually consultancy firms) in order to acquire expertise, know-how and best 
practices. 
This perspective is very useful to explain the process of design of the 
formal configuration of  TOROC: 
- The "designer"  of the TOROC has identified the objective (consisting in the 
organization of  successful Games) and has defined the activities to be 
performed and the "crafts" she deemed necessary; 
- The designer has collected activities and crafts into jobs, clarifying also the 
requirements in terms of experience and competences. 
- She has implemented training plans tailored to the individual jobs. 
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- She has grouped the jobs into homogeneous units and assigned authorities 
and responsibilities, thus finalizing the organization chart. 
This design process has been deemed too complex for being managed by 
people without any experience in the organization of the Olympic Games, 
hence the IOC tried to control it by means of the Olympic knowledge 
management system and by proposing best practices and procedures. The 
Olympic knowledge management system is therefore not only a tool for 
training and learning, but also (and above all) an essential tool to support and 
address the activities related to organizational design. 
The organizational choices implemented by TOROC appear fully 
consistent with the action plan proposed by the IOC: TOROC is initially 
configured by Functions, in order to benefit from high specialization and, as the 
Games approaches, it starts a relevant process of decentralization of decision-
making attributions. 
From this theoretical perspective, TOROC seems to have designed 
consistently its organizational configuration in order to efficiently achieve its 
final goal: the organization of successful Olympic Games. 
 
Neo-institutional Theory (DiMaggio, Powell, 1983) is often used (e.g. 
Ferrara, 2001; Theodoraki, 2007) to explain the homogeneity and the persistence 
of a number of organizational choices between the various editions of the 
Games. This theoretical perspective, in fact, explains the homogeneity of 
organizational solutions by asserting that enterprises behave and compete to 
acquire institutional legitimacy, rather than mere economic and technical 
efficiency. According to DiMaggio and Powell, "organizations compete not just 
for resources and customers, but for political power and institutional 
legitimacy, for social as well economic fitness" (DiMaggio, Powell, 1983: 150). 
After the spontaneous emergence of a legitimate organizational field, 
enterprises acting within such field are exposed to a set of uncontrollable forces 
which drive them to become more and more homogeneous: "by organizational 
field, we mean those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a 
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recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar 
services or products" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148). 
The process forcing enterprises operating in the organizational field to 
become similar to each other is called institutional isomorphism. DiMaggio and 
Powell identifies three types of institutional isomorphism: coercive, mimetic 
and normative. The coercive isomorphism "results from both formal and 
informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which 
they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which 
organizations function" (DiMaggio, Powell 1983: 150). The mimetic 
isomorphism influences the organizations which have a poor understanding of 
relevant technologies and cannot identify detailed goals for inspiring their 
behavior. These organizations try to govern the high uncertainty to which they 
are exposed by replicating configurations and strategies adopted by the most 
successful organizations operating in the organizational field. Finally, 
normative isomorphism stems from professionalization, i.e. the "collective 
struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of 
their work, to control “the production of producers", and to establish a 
cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy "(DiMaggio, 
Powell, 1983: 152). 
In the case of the Olympics, the purpose of the organizers cannot be 
strictly related to economic efficiency, instead they seem to pursue global 
visibility and social legitimacy (both nationally and internationally). As part of 
the Olympic organizational field, the organizational choices of OCOG can be 
interpreted as resulting from isomorphic pressures. In particular, the Olympic 
organizational field can be shaped around the subjects belonging to, and 
cooperating with, the Olympic Movement. Initially, the relationships upon 
which the organizational field has emerged have been structured and 
legitimized through the efforts of Cubertin and then through political 
processes; in recent decades, the Olympic organizational field has extended to 
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private companies (the “partners” of the Games) and to various subjects 
involved in the organization of the Olympics. 
In this context, the behavior of the IOC is critical, in fact it seems to be 
actively trying to make the different editions of the Games as similar and 
homogeneous as possible. The most important subjects acting on the 
organizational field, namely Sport Federations, Sponsors, and the media, take 
advantage of such homogeneity and stimulate it. These subjects actually 
generate isomorphic pressures on OCOGs.  
At the analytical level, in the case of Torino 2006, the three types of 
isomorphism identified by DiMaggio and Powell appear to have been acting on 
TOROC. First, the choices of TOROC are derived from "impositions" by other 
organizations on which it depends. The IOC directly or indirectly imposes 
organizational configurations, strategies, and management techniques. The 
Olympic knowledge management system, ultimately, is a method for forcing 
TOROC to implement specific (and standardized) organizational solutions. 
Even the Olympic traditions and ceremonies that have been institutionalized 
over time eventually become sources of coercive isomorphism. In the same 
way, other subjects such as sport teams, TV networks, governments and 
regulatory bodies are pushing for the homogenization of the competitions, 
calendars and schedules of events.  
With regard to mimetic isomorphism, it should be noted how the 
organization of the Olympics is exposed to environmental contingencies and 
high uncertainty with reference to technologies and objectives; to face such 
challenges OCOGs typically refer to the choices adopted by their predecessors. 
This imitation strategy is also induced by IOC, which provides OCOGs with the 
Olympic knowledge management system, with best practices and with training 
initiatives. 
Finally, with reference to normative isomorphism, it is possible to 
highlight the fact that those involved in organizing the Olympic Games often 
have similar curricula and professional experiences. They are not already 
skilled with reference to Games organization, but usually they are managers 
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who have worked in public or private companies and have important 
managerial competences and reputation. In addition, the training programs 
proposed by IOC stimulate the indoctrination of values and behaviors 
consistent with the "Olympic spirit".  
The neo-institutionalist theory explains in detail many of the 
organizational and strategic choices made by TOROC. However, certain critical 
issues still emerge. In particular, it is difficult to explain the reasons for the 
relevant differences in operational decisions implemented by the Organizing 
Committees of the various editions of the Games; often, in fact, under a 
common and traditional denomination, we can witness very different policies 
and strategies. 
Obviously, the reason for this heterogeneity can be attributed to the 
difference in the organizational field in which every OCOG operates. This 
explanation, however, would undermine the foundation of the neo-
institutionalist analysis, i.e. the homogeneity in organizational choices. 
To remain within the path of the neo-institutionalist perspective, we can 
refer to the dual nature of the organizational field in which the Organizing 
Committees operates: a persistent organizational field (based on IOC, Sports 
Federations, Sponsors, etc.) that is complemented by an organizational field 
which is peculiar to each edition (thus implying a concept of institutional 
legitimacy differently qualified each time).  
Hence, the Organizing Committees would behave to achieve legitimacy 
with respect to both the persistent organizational field (hence the homogeneity 
of the editions), and the peculiar organization field (thus fostering 
heterogeneity with respect to previous editions): the actual behavior of OCOGs 
stems from the "reconciliation” of these two sources of legitimacy; this would 
also explain the non-perfect homogeneity of the solutions implemented over 
the time. Finally, it is important to underline that Organizing Committees are 
neither able to choose the organizational field in which they have to operate 
(the organizational field emerges from a spontaneous process of 
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institutionalization) nor to decide about the conditions of legitimacy (which 
depend on social values and conditions not governable by OCOGs). 
 
In the next paragraphs, the main facts related to the organization of the 
Olympic Games will be interpreted in the light of the Theory of Organizational 
Action (TAO), proposed by Bruno Maggi (1984/1990; 2003) as part of an 
"innovative tradition" he has drawn from the classics contributions by Max 
Weber, Chester Barnard, Herbert Simon and James Thompson. TAO defines the 
organization as a process of actions and decisions; it is not a reified system, 
objective or objectified, but a social action, a continuous process of adjustment 
of the action to achieve a desired objective in conditions of bounded and 
intentional rationality. 
According to the theory of J.D. Thompson (1967), the organizational 
action defines its "domain", i.e. the range of products (and, therefore, the main 
technologies it is willing to control), the target population and the additional 
services it is going to supply. The decision about what and how to do 
something implies the identification of the relevant technologies (as well as the 
identification of the technologies the organization is willing to control and the 
technologies it is going to “buy” outside its boundaries). Given the bounded 
rationality of human decision-making processes, organizational action is never 
able to preside over the entire matrix of technologies related to its domain. 
Therefore, definition of the domain necessarily involves the development of 
dependencies from other subjects (i.e. the subjects who preside over the 
technologies which are relevant for the organization but not managed by it). 
Then, Thompson introduces the concept of task environment as the set of 
entities with which the organizational action finds itself in conditions of 
interdependence (e.g. customers, suppliers, competitors for markets and 
resources, regulatory groups). The choice of domain is therefore an intentional 
act, and the task environment stems from that decision. 
This conception of the environment as determined by organizational 
choices marks the difference between the Thompson’s Theory and the theories 
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mentioned above, which considers the environment as an exogenous and pre-
existing factor imposing the organizational adaptation (Maggi, 2003). 
In any case, the task environment still have a fundamental importance 
because, on the one hand, it has to express a consensus (even implicitly) about 
the domain claimed by the organization and, on the other hand, because it is in 
conditions of interdependence with such organization.  
The consensus on the domain is essential for the actual development of 
the organizational action. It expresses a set of expectations about what the 
organization will or will not do and is reflected in the agreement expressed by 
the subjects to enter into relationships with the organization. However, when 
an element of the task environment expresses the consensus on the domain 
claimed by the focal organization, this implies a change in its own domain (in 
analytical terms, the element of the task environment changes its domain to 
embrace the actions requested by the focal organization); so the element of the 
task environment, right through its consensus, develops dependence on the 
focal organization. A situation of mutual dependence (interdependence) is then 
established, with the organization and the elements of the task environment 
trying to use their power to impose constraints and contingencies to each other 
and simultaneously trying to reduce their exposure to the contingencies posed 
by the other.  
This situation depicts a complex relationship in which the subjects 
continuously try to increase their power and reduce their dependence. In this 
theoretical perspective (Emerson, 1962) power is conceived in relational terms, 
not as an attribute: each subject, at any time, exercises power and undergoes 
dependence on the other. The management of interdependencies therefore 
requires special attention. 
TOROC has stated its domain as soon as it was established. This choice is 
not definitive, but exposed to constant change during organizational action. 
Initially, TOROC decides what will be its reference population and what 
products and services to supply. In fact, the first decision on the domain takes 
place at the time of submission of the application of the candidature of Torino 
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2006: the dossier submitted to IOC contains the fundamental elements of the 
domain of the possible organization of the Games. First, the application defines 
in analytical terms the places and the calendar of the competitions, the 
organizational choices and their schedule, the investment that will be carried 
out, the estimated levels of service. This affirmation of domain obviously needs 
the consensus of the IOC, but this is not sufficient for the domain to become 
operative: it is also necessary the consensus of other elements of the task 
environment, in particular of local collectivities, national institutions, athletes 
and Olympic professionals. Since then, the domain is continuously fine-tuned 
by TOROC by detailing and amending both the objectives and the organization 
of means to achieve them. 
With respect to organizational goals, it is important to understand that 
both the members of the Organizing Committee and the elements that compose 
the task environment have their own expectations regarding the objectives of 
the organization. In other words, every subject (internal and external to the 
organizational action) has interests and goals for the organization. The athletes 
want sport infrastructures which can facilitate the achievement of superior 
performances, local and national institutions pursue visibility, residents of host 
city ask for low impact on the environment and for the maximization of the 
value of the Olympic legacy. The Nation Olympic Committee of the county 
hosting the Games tries to gain prestige within the international Olympic 
Movement, while the IOC is concerned in preserving the uniqueness of the 
Olympic Games and in enhancing their appeal and their economic turnover.  
However, at any time, only a small number of subjects will be able to 
actually address the organizational choices in directions consistent with their 
objectives: since power lays on social relationships, it evolves and changes over 
time, constantly changing the ability of the various subjects to influence the 
organization's goals. 
TOROC is therefore at the center of a dense network of 
interdependencies with the task environment; a network governed by complex 
political processes.  The objectives inspiring the organizational action are not 
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defined as a consequence of a simple mediation between the many different 
objectives coalescing around the organization. On the contrary, TOROC 
develops processes of decisions and actions which are intended to create 
proactive goals. By overcoming the deterministic interpretation of power as an 
attribute of a subject, this theoretical perspective views the goals as the result of 
power/dependence relations between TOROC and the subjects of the task 
environment. 
It is also interesting to notice that the dynamics of power to which 
TOROC is exposed change over time: at the time of the application of the 
candidature, the Organizing Committee is in strongly dependent on the IOC, 
which has the power to choose the host of the Games, on the local institutions, 
which must support the candidature, and on the local communities which must 
agree to bear the burdens of the Games. 
Once the Host City Contract is signed, there is a balance of power: after 
choosing the host city, the IOC loses the possibility to find alternative locations 
and, therefore, is bounded in strong relationships with TOROC. The IOC then 
increases its dependence on TOROC, since the Olympic venue becomes non-
fungible and the OCOG becomes essential to allow the efficient achievement of 
the Olympics. The IOC still has, however, very strong power premises since it is 
able to influence the behavior of the Organizing Committee. With respect to the 
power-dependence relationships, it is important to recall the problems faced by 
the IOC and the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games of Athens 2004: 
in that case, delays and inefficiencies in the organization of the event and in the 
development of infrastructures put the IOC and the Organizing Committee into 
serious difficulties, the former claimed extraordinary interventions and 
eventually imposed the removal of the President of the latter, threatening the 
withdrawal of the Games. 
The relative dependence on the IOC does not exhaust the power-
dependence relations of TOROC: strong interdependencies are present also in 
relation to other subjects of the task environment. First, TOROC has no 
spending power, because the Government put the Agenzia Torino 2006 in 
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charge of the budget of the investments; so TOROC has to negotiate and 
schedule infrastructure investments with that agency. In addition, any 
infrastructure intervention, as well as the choices related to the Olympic 
calendar and ceremonies, must be "negotiated" with local institutions and the 
public opinion. 
On the other hand, TOROC has the ability to utilize the Olympic name 
and logo and thus it acquires great prestige, which can be used to influence the 
behavior of other subjects and, ultimately, to increase criticality and decrease 
fungibility within power-dependence relationships (Emerson, 1962; Thompson; 
1967). 
The decisions concerning the domain also involve choices about the 
boundaries in which TOROC can exercise its control (Masino, Maggi, 2001, 
Maggi, 2003; Masino, 2005). 
The domain and the choices related to the management of the 
boundaries are phenomena peculiar and distinctive of any organizational 
action. In the case of the Torino Games, it is evident that the choices made by 
TOROC are quite different from those implemented by the Organizing 
Committees of previous editions.  
As already noted, the IOC acts in order to standardize and homogenize 
as much as possible the organizational choices adopted by Organizing 
Committee of each Olympics; in addition, the Olympic Knowledge Transfer 
Programme can be interpreted as an attempt by IOC to impose common 
solutions and techniques (best practices and know-how are decision premises 
the IOC "conveys" to TOROC). Nevertheless, the OCOG of every edition revises 
and interprets differently these rules. In Torino, TOROC has decided to 
undertake a very particular strategy, implementing tight relationships with 
external partners without giving up control on strategic decisions and 
interventions; TOROC also assigned relevant control and coordination 
attributions to its central Functional directions. 
Through the choices related to the definition and redefinition of its 
domain, TOROC defines and arranges the behavior of its main components, 
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which become interdependent. Thompson identifies three typical forms of 
interdependence: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal, which are connected to 
three typical forms of coordination: by standardization, by plan, and by mutual 
adjustment. 
The three forms of coordination are characterized by different 
complexity and, ultimately, by the cost involved.  
According to Thompson, the interdependent components of the 
organization are structured (grouped) within units to lower the total cost of 
coordination. 
The units, and thus the organizational hierarchy, are then the result of an 
aggregation process aimed at coordinating the cooperative behaviors of the 
subjects. To this end, priority is given to the grouping of mutually 
interdependent positions in units of first level. If it is not possible to group all 
mutually interdependent positions within the same unit, it is possible to create 
sub-units which can then be coordinated within a super-unit. Once grouped the 
positions characterized by mutual interdependence, it becomes relevant to 
facilitate the coordination of sequential interdependent behavior, with the 
grouping of sequentially interdependent units within higher-level units. 
Finally, once solved the problems related to the coordination of mutual 
and sequential interdependent behavior, the organization tries grouping 
together the homogeneous units to facilitate coordination through 
standardization. 
In Thompson's perspective, the result of this structuration process is 
never permanent since the organizational action constantly changes its domain 
and the technologies it presides, thus imposing a continuous structuration 
process. 
It is also important to underline how the process of structuring allows a 
wide variety of choices: actually, the subjects involved in the organization 
operate within complex and multidimensional networks of interdependencies, 
hence the identification of the grouping priorities is the result of intentional 
decision-making processes.  
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At first, TOROC pursues the coordination of behaviors which are 
mutually and sequentially interdependent within groups operating with the 
same technology (the "occupation"); this is achieved by means of Functions. The 
coordination of the interdependent behavior of subjects operating within 
different technologies is not deemed important at this time and therefore cross-
functions coordination is implemented at a higher level: the Top Management 
is in charge of this kind of coordination. These choices should stimulate the 
learning of Olympic knowledge, thanks to the tight interactions between 
subjects dealing with the same problems and technologies. TOROC can also 
implement a large body of specialized rules that will, in future, provide 
guidelines for operational activities.  
When the relationships within the Functions become consolidated and 
specialized knowledge is developed, for TOROC it becomes critical to enable 
subject from different technologies to cooperate. TOROC then establishes cross-
functional groups, mainly in the form of committees and task forces, in order to 
coordinate the cooperative behavior of the different groups of occupations. 
As the Games time approaches, it becomes essential to facilitate the 
coordinated behavior of the subjects working in the same venue. TOROC acts 
by replacing the previous units based of functional groups and by focusing on 
interdependences among people acting within the same venue. Venuization can 
then be interpreted as a strategy to promote the coordination of interdependent 
behavior of subjects acting within a venue during the Games Time. 
 
The organization of the Olympic Games could also be interpreted as a 
synthetic organization (Thompson, 1967). However, this interpretation cannot 
be considered correct since the synthetic organization is an organization which 
arises (usually as a consequence of unpredictable catastrophic events) without 
the benefit of preliminary rules and with a very strong teleological orientation 
(the subjects are committed in pursuing common, immediate and tangible 
goals). The most important feature of the synthetic organization lies on the fact 
that, at the same time, it has to operate and to regulate its behavior, without 
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being able to take advantage of preliminary rules, thus preventing 
organizational action from being efficient. 
With reference to the regulation process, Maggi (2003) distinguishes 
between preliminary regulation and contextual regulation. According to the 
TAO, both preliminary and contextual rules contribute to the regulation of the 
behavior. In the different processes of action, however, these two forms of 
regulation acquire different size and importance. 
From an analytical point of view, most organizational actions in the 
seven years preceding the Olympics are aimed at defining preliminary rules to 
facilitate the coordination of decisions and actions during the Games Time. It is 
a seven-year period in which TOROC undergoes a massive process of 
preliminary regulation of the behavior that will take place in Games Time. This 
stems from a typical constraint associated with the Olympics: the uniqueness 
and non-repeatability of the event. This situation precludes any heuristic 
learning and any possibility of performance improvement over time (as the 
case, for example, of a business start-up which, by its nature, is oriented to stay 
and evolve over time). Therefore, the Organizing Committee acts to pre-arrange 
its behavior in the Olympic period. All the various organizational choices made 
in the preparatory period have the (direct or indirect) objective to arrange as 
precisely as possible the collective behavior during the Olympics. However, the 
bounded rationality characterizing the decision-making processes inhibits the 
absolute predetermination of the actions to be carried out during the Games. 
The Organizing Committee is therefore forced to develop preliminary rules (i.e. 
rules that pre-ordering a general and indicative) and (being the 
predetermination impossible) to delegate responsibility and decision-making 
attributions. The venuization strategies try to meet this kind of needs. 
Unlike synthetic organization, then, the organization of the Olympic 
Games can be interpreted as a seven-year process aimed at establishing rules to 
give a preliminary order to the action which will take place in Games Time. As 
shown by Maggi, however, even such a massive regulation process can not be 
able to exclude the need for contextual regulation. 
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Moreover, according to the theoretical perspective proposed by Simon 
(1947), to effectively control the behavior of subjects during the Games Time, 
the Organizing Committee must be able to influence the premises upon which 
they base their decision-making processes. Thompson's detailed analysis of the 
control process contends that these premises consist primarily in preferences 
about the expected results (i.e. the objectives) and assumptions about the cause-
effect relationships to be mobilized in order to achieve the expected result (i.e. 
technology). In order to actually influence the behavior of the subjects on the 
field, then, the Organizing Committee should be able to "transmit" to each of 
them both unambiguous objectives and relevant technologies to achieve them. 
The definition of unambiguous objectives is difficult because, given the 
complex power-dependence relationships which characterize the organization 
of the Games, these objectives are numerous and sometimes inconsistent (for 
instance, in case of weather conditions that make the ski slopes not perfectly 
viable, the venue manager is exposed at least to two conflicting goals: to delay 
the event to ensure that competition takes place in perfect conditions, or to go 
on with the races, in order to preserve the Olympic calendar and then the TV 
coverage and the needs of the sponsors). With respect to the definition of the 
technology to be deployed, it is very difficult for the Organizing Committee to 
identify the one-best-way to achieve the objectives, since contingencies may 
significantly alter the conditions in which the behavior is to be performed. The 
uncertainties characterizing both the goals and technologies of the OCOG allow 
to explain the high degree of discretion left and imposed to subjects during the 
Games time. Such an extensive discretion assigned to venues could be 
interpreted as a form of autonomy. In fact, during the Games time, the venue is 
required to make important decisions without preliminary permissions or 
instructions from the headquarter, which is alerted just in case of very critical 
events. From this point of view, the venuization process transforms TOROC 
into a network of “quasi-autonomous” venues, coordinated and supported by a 
light headquarter. 
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Maggi (1984/1990; 2003) proposes an interesting point of view clarifying 
meanings and logical relations existing between the concepts of autonomy and 
discretion. According to Maggi, autonomy means independence, self-
regulation, self-governing and it is opposed to the concept of heteronomy, i.e. 
the regulation process coming from other subjects. Maggi then distinguishes, 
from an analytical point of view, the regulation process from the actual decision 
and action process. Autonomy and heteronomy are related to the regulation 
process, while the discretion is related to the possibility for a subject to choose, 
basing on preliminary rules, among a set of alternatives. Hence, the rule 
assumed by a subject as a premise for her decision-making process can be 
autonomous (i.e. created by the subject herself) or heteronomous (i.e. imposed 
by other subjects). A rule, autonomously or heteronomously defined, may 
allow the subject to choose between different paths of actions (thus assigning 
discretion to the subject), or may impose the adoption of a predetermined path 
of action. 
From this point of views, is it possible to state that venues are truly 
autonomous during the Games time? The answer is definitely negative: the 
headquarter, before delegating responsibilities to the venues, defines (through 
the roadmap and the various operational plans) detailed rules and specific 
procedures in order to tightly regulate the operations of each venue during the 
Games time. Therefore, each venue receives a large corpus of heteronomous 
rules, to which it must necessarily conform. These rules usually assign high 
discretion to the venues in order to facilitate the efficient management of 
contingencies. Hence, venues, far from being autonomous, are largely governed 
by external rules that allow and force them to exercise their discretion.  
In fact, it is possible to view the organizational action carried out by 
TOROC in the seven years before the Olympics as a massive effort to exclude, 
limit, and prevent venues from exercising autonomy. This interpretation is also 
consistent with respect to the peculiarities of the organization of the Games: 
since it is a one-shot event, not repeatable, with predetermined deadlines and 
schedule, the Organizing Committee requires an absolute respect of rules and 
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procedures. If every venue was really independent, it would create a situation 
of quasi-anarchy, which would endanger timing and unity of purpose, and, 
ultimately, the Olympics itself. 
Hence, the exercise of autonomy during the Games Time can be 
regarded as one of the most critical contingencies to which the organization of 
the Olympics is exposed. This is true at different decision levels: the IOC tries to 
prevent TOROC from being autonomous, as well as TOROC acts to limit 
autonomous behaviors from the venues. 
 
Conclusion 
The Olympics are the biggest and most complex sports and media event 
of our times. Their organization imposes an unparalleled organizational 
commitment and requires a complex process of decisions and actions. 
The analysis of this process, at its various levels, is of great interest for 
Organization Theory: it allows to analyze the entire life of the organization and 
to explain the choices implemented by participants in the various situations. 
In this paper we presented the most important organizational choices 
adopted by the TOROC in the planning of the Torino Olympic Games. Then, 
these decisions have been explained through different theoretical perspectives. 
The interpretation developed on the basis of the Project Management 
Theory emphasizes the importance of governance and control systems set up by 
TOROC. Consistent with this point of view are the contributions of Lawrence 
and Lorsch, about the influence of environment on organizational decisions, 
and the contribution of Mintzberg, which emphasizes the role of the designer in 
organizational design. These theories are consistent with each other and can 
offer a unifying point of view about the organization of the Games. They share 
the vision of the organization as a system predetermined or predictable, in 
which the subjects operate in conditions of absolute rationality in order to 
efficiently achieve a shared goal. 
In the perspective of the Organizational Action, the organization 
(intended as a process of decisions and actions) operates heuristically under 
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conditions of bounded and intentional rationality. Therefore, the participants 
are not able to have a perfect knowledge of the aims of the organization and of 
the means available. According to this theoretical perspective, however, 
bounded rationality does not determine a complete organizational ambiguity, 
because the subjects are intentionally rational, that is, they try to identify the 
purpose to be satisfied and to arrange the available means to achieve it.  
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